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THE ENVIRONMENTAL ROLE OF
AGRICULTURE IN AN ERA OF CARBON
CAPS
Donald T Hornstein'
The link between the production of food and the environmental
regulation of farms, never a strong one, may finally begin to take
shape as the world grapples with the new Carboniferous era, a man-
made epoch of climate change and climate-change regulation. Such a
development is long overdue. Almost half a century has passed since
the initial publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,' the book that
launched modem environmentalism. Yet the environmental law that
emerged from this movement has always been, from the perspective
of Rachel Carson's messages in Silent Spring, deeply disappointing.
In a narrow sense, the disappointment relates to the environmental law
that governs farms. Not only is the regulation of agricultural pesti-
cides - the central subject matter of Silent Spring - notoriously unsuc-
cessful,2 but environmental law as a general matter is so riddled with
exemptions for agriculture that it has been described as the "anti-law"
of farms. 3 But modern environmental law also disappoints on a dee-
per level. Silent Spring's broader message was a respect for natural
processes that Rachel Carson hoped would realign our economics,
t Aubrey L. Brooks Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law, and Curriculum in Environment and Ecology, University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill. I am grateful for the research assistance of William
Krueger, Daniel Peterson, and Eli Hornstein. All errors, of course, are my own.
1 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
2 See, e.g., Donald Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on
the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. REG. 369, 371
(1993) ("[T]he use of risk assessments to discern 'reasonable risk' under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) has arguably led to one of the
most colossal regulatory failures in Washington."); see also id. at 394 ("EPA's
Science Advisory Board concluded in 1990 that, when compared with dozens of other
risks, pesticides presented one of the country's more widespread and severe environ-
mental problems.").
3 See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 267 (2000) (Congress has made "a nearly unbroken
series of decisions to exclude farms and farming from the burdens of federal envi-
ronmental law, with states mainly following suit. Congress has erected what I will
call a vast 'anti-law' of farms and the environment.").
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pushing us to find ways to integrate human endeavors with nature in a
way that today we would term "sustainable." In contrast, modem
environmental law has generally focused merely on outputs rather
than inputs, on cleaning up waste-streams rather than changing under-
4lying economic processes.
But climate change may be shaking up how we look at agriculture
and the environment. To some extent, the changing climate itself is
already beginning to affect the natural inputs on which farming is
based: historical weather patterns and their associated ranges
of rainfall, temperature, wind, snowpack, river levels, and
weed/insect/pathogen populations.' And changes in these inputs have
provoked serious discussions in the public policy literature about: the
amounts and types of food that agriculture may be capable of produc-
ing in a climate-changed world;6 about which agricultural regions may
be hardest hit;7 and about the types of governmental or market-based
support services farmers may need in order to adapt.
4 David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input
Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 74 (2009) ("The vast majority of our mandatory
environmental regulations focus on pollution outputs rather than production inputs").
5 See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE STERN REVIEW (2007) (increases in the frequency and intensity of regional high
temperature weather patterns are likely to cause extensive species extinction, violent
rises in sea levels, varying freshwater runoff, and result in critical reductions in crop
yields); W.E. Easterling et al., Food, Fibre and Forest Products, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 273-313 (poorer populations who rely on subsistence farming
and have less resources to adapt to the effects of global climate change are highly
likely to see crop yields reduced, in addition to a spread in human disease affecting
the agricultural labor supply).
6 See, e.g., Bruna Barbier et al., Human Vulnerability to Climate Variability
in the Sahel: Farmers' Adaptation Strategies in Northern Burkina Faso, 43 ENVTL.
MGMT. 790 (2009) (describing a case study of such local farming adaptation strate-
gies as planting more drought-resistant crops, using more inorganic fertilizer, and the
development of improved irrigation); see also James Risbey et al., Scale, Context, and
Decision Making in Agricultural Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change, 4
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES GLOBAL CHANGE 137-65 (1999) (case study
on Australian farmers' adaptation strategies which include the planting of different
crops, varying planting dates, the purchasing of crop insurance, modifications in
fertilizers, and updated irrigation techniques).
7 See, e.g., Ian Burton & Bo Lim, Achieving Adequate Adaptation in Agri-
culture, 70 CLIMATE CHANGE 191 (2005) (describing the uncertainty as to exactly
where and to what extent different regions of the world will be affected by climate
change); W.N. Adger, Social Aspects of Adaptive Capacity, CLIMATE CHANGE,
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENT (Joel B. Smith et al. eds., 2003) (projections
and uncertainty in prediction which regions will be most affected by climate change).
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This Article, however, addresses a different aspect of agriculture
and the emerging environmental law of climate change. In discussing
how society might mitigate its emissions of greenhouse gases, poli-
cymakers have come full circle, returning to the deeper project that
Rachel Carson proposed for us fifty years ago: to realign the processes
of the economy within the constraints of the natural world. Much of
this discussion has focused on energy, the principal source of green-
house gas ("GHG") emissions.9 But a surprising amount of attention
has recently shifted to agriculture.
In part, the link between agriculture and climate-change mitiga-
tion reflects the fact that agriculture itself generates GHG emissions
(in the United States under ten percent).10 In larger part, though, it is
because agriculture and forestry may offer relatively cost-effective
opportunities to adopt processes that can capture and store ("sequest-
er") excess GHGs from the atmosphere in carbon sinks such as bio-
mass or soil." In a white paper in 2007 (and in its revision in 2009),
McKinsey & Company, the international consultancy firm, found that
"terrestrial carbon" locked up in forestry and agriculture could match
the carbon abatement potential of switching to alternative, low-carbon
energy supplies. Indeed, McKenzie found that, because of its low per-
unit cost, land-based carbon sequestration was one of three major
business opportunities in a low-carbon economy. 12 With science and
See, e.g., Alexandra Scuro, Are GMOs Good or Bad Seeds in the Develop-
ing World?: A Discussion ofthe Growing Role ofDeveloping Countries in the Debate
Over Climate Change and the Loss ofBiodiversity, 18 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 369,
374 (2007) (use of genetically modified organisms and seeds may be a necessary
adaptation to the depending effects of climate change and its concomitant risk of
human starvation); see also Insurance Tool Helps Farmers, Nations Manage Climate
Change Risk, AFRICA NEWS, June 18, 2009 (increasing use of previously unavailable
crop insurance on the African continent).
9 C.S. Snyder et al., Review of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Crop Pro-
duction Systems and Fertilizer Management Effects, 133 AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS &
ENV'T 247, 248 (2009) ("fossil fuel combustion is considered responsible for more
than 75% of human-caused CO 2 emissions").
10 Id. ("agriculture generates less than 10% of the total emissions of GHGs in
the United States").
11 RENEE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF
THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 9 (2009),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33898.pdf ("Agriculture can sequester carbon,
which may offset GHG emissions by capturing and storing carbon in agricultural
soils.").
12 McKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LoW-CARBON ECONOMY: VERSION 2 OF
THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE 12 (2009),
http://www.wwf.se/source.php/l 226616/Pathways%20to%20a%2OLow-Carbon%20
Economy,%20Executive%2OSummary.pdf (terrestrial carbon represents an opportu-
nity to reduce twelve gigatons of carbon-dioxide-equivalent emissions, making it one
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economics suggesting the prospect of a win-win situation, it did not
take long for politicians to recognize the possibilities. In June 2009,
the historic Waxman-Markey climate bill narrowly passed the U.S.
House of Representatives. The bill passed only with the support of an
agricultural bloc that successfully inserted provisions allowing for an
"offset" market that would allow carbon emitters to pay farmers for
undertaking greenhouse-friendly ways to grow crops.
This Article seeks not to celebrate the possibility of a market for
agricultural offsets. The technical and economic difficulties of this
market may in fact overwhelm its superficial appeal, turning it from a
win-win solution into a rent-seeking loophole that undermines, rather
than enhances, society's need to control GHG atmospheric concentra-
tions. To paraphrase Gustave Flaubert, it all depends on the details.14
But this Article does seek to sketch the possible new threshold on
which agriculture currently finds itself - as the subject of perhaps the
world's first legal regime self-consciously seeking not merely to cor-
rect an environmental externality, but to align economic processes
more holistically within ecological constraints. To be sure, by sketch-
ing this threshold, I certainly do not mean to claim that, in even a
successful market for agricultural carbon offsets, Rachel Carson's
dream would be fulfilled. Other reform efforts within agriculture,
such as the growth of organic farmings and the movement for locally-
grown agriculture,16 can also stake claims as ideological descendents
of Rachel Carson's vision. My points are more modest. First, by
looking at the example of climate-related policymaking in agriculture,
we are given a valuable case history of what the contours (and diffi-
culties) may be of a new generation of environmental-agricultural
laws that really do attempt the heavy lifting that Rachel Carson urged
of three major areas of business opportunities along with alternative, low-carbon
energy supply (12 GtCO2 reduction potential) and improvements in energy efficiency
(14 GtCO 2 reduction potential)).
13 See Legislation, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1546 (July 3, 2009) (House of
Representatives passed H.R. 2454 on June 26, 2009 that includes a system of offsets
that farmers and forest owners would be able to generate by adhering to practices that
sequester carbon in the soil or that reduce emissions); see infra notes 92-96.
14 See GREGORY TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR
PROVERBS AND SAYINGS 119 (1996) (attributing to Gustave Flaubert the sayings "God
is in the details" and "the devil is in the details").
15 See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons From Or-
ganic Agriculture for Market-and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541 (2006)
(describing the growth of organic farming).
16 See, e.g., Susan A. Schneider, Reconnecting Consumers and Producers:
On the Path Toward a Sustainable Food and Agriculture Policy, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 75, 84 (2009) (discussing growth of local farmers markets and the locally-grown-
produce movement).
148 HEALTH MA TRIX [Vol. 20:145
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ROLE OF AGRICULTURE
us to try. Second, by considering the science, policy design, and eco-
nomics of an agricultural offset market, we can see the contours of a
new playing field on which farmers worldwide may soon be operat-
ing.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A NEW AGRICULTURE:
THE END(ING) OF TRADITIONAL CROP SUBSIDIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
In a country where agricultural regions are given disproportio-
nately greater political representation in the legislature (South Dakota
has the same number of United States Senators as either New York or
California), the attraction and political economy of agricultural subsi-
dies coming from Washington, D.C. probably need little elaboration.
Less appreciated, however, are the effects of globalization and free
trade on what otherwise would be a purely domestic (and politically
cozy) set of agricultural policies. Recently, pressure from free-trade
has begun to crack the system of federal agricultural subsidies that, for
over half a century, have shaped the mindset and crop production de-
cisions of conventional farmers. Among other things, this means that
the future may hold fewer financial incentives to support vast mono-
cultures that, due to artificial price supports, regularly produce more
crops, such as corn, than a freer market would dictate.
Such a development could have enormous implications both for
the practice of agriculture and for the nation's food supply. Agricultu-
rally, upon the removal of price incentives that only incentivize far-
mers to produce more, growers may finally be able to direct their
knowledge and experience toward less environmentally destructive,
agricultural systems. This outcome may be even more likely if the
government paid farmers who produce positive environmental exter-
nalities in their production systems. And, as a side note, the implica-
tions of this development for the food supply, nutrition, and public
health could be significant; a market stripped of artificially cheap corn
- and high-fructose corn syrup - for example, might significantly im-
pact the American diet.17 This development in international trade -
the ending of agricultural subsidies that reward overproduction - de-
serves to be briefly amplified.
17 Jedediah Purdy & James Salzman, Corn Futures: Consumer Politics,
Health, and Climate Change, DUKE L. SCH. RES. PAPER SERIES No. 216, August 2008,
at 4 ("[t]he low cost of high-fructose corn syrup explains how convenience stores can
turn a profit selling a half gallon of soda for 69 cents .... [tihe low cost of corn as
cattle-feed makes beef cheaper, allowing fast-food chains to supersize burgers and
still sell them for less than ever before in inflation-adjusted terms.").
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Between the New Deal and the 1990s, Congress authorized a sys-
tem of agricultural subsidies, such as "deficiency" payments' 8 and
nonrecourse loans,' 9 which were designed to support farmers' in-
comes without regard to the vagaries of crop yield. This system
rewarded farmers simply for producing a crop without regard to mar-
ket demand. 20 In the mid-1990s, however, Congress approved the
results of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, creating the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and "for the first time subjected
U.S. agricultural subsidies to significant restrictions under global trade
rules." 2 ' The rationale for this shift was the idea that growth in Amer-
ican agricultural exports, under the WTO's liberalized trading regime,
would provide farmers with an expanded source of income that would
more than counterbalance a reduced stream of agricultural subsidies.
Accordingly, in its 1996 Farm Bill, Congress limited domestic agri-
cultural subsidies to $19.1 billion by eliminating deficiency payments
and replacing them with a series of fixed payments that would dimi-
22
nish over a seven-year period.
Soon, however, this shift in thinking was tested. In the late 1990s,
agricultural commodity prices collapsed, and Congress responded
with new farm legislation that sought to reverse the diminishing pay-
ments it had approved in 1996.23 In 2002, Congress again increased
farm subsidies in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
200224 (the 2002 "Farm Bill"). 25 To square these actions with its ear-
lier approval of the Uruguay Round of international trade rules (under
18 In 1973, Congress allowed for the establishment of target prices for certain
crops. See Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, 7 U.S.C. § 612(c)
(2006) (establishing target prices for certain crops); § 1445(b-3) (repealed) (If market
prices failed to reach target prices, farmers enrolled in "deficiency" programs re-
ceived "deficiency payments" equal to the difference between the market and target
prices.).
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714p (2006). Under a nonrecourse loan program, the
Commodity Credit Corporation offers nonrecourse loans at a government-set loan
rate, which acts as a government-guaranteed minimum price for the commodity; if the
market price falls below the loan rate, the farmer simply forfeits the crop (the loan's
sole collateral) to the government and keeps the loan. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1425
(2006).
20 Purdy & Salzman, supra note 17, at 3.
21 Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the
WTO's Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 999, 1002 (2006).
22 Id. at 1003.
23 Id. at 1004.
24 See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C. § 7901
(2002), suspended by, Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 Pub. L. 110-234,
122 Stat. 923 (2008).
25 See Porterfield, supra note 21, at 1004.
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which agricultural subsidies were to be reduced), Congress attempted
to gain international support for reinvigorating domestic subsidy pro-
grams through the so-called "Doha Round" of international trade talks
that began in Doha, Qatar, in 2001.26 The Doha Round, however,
seemed to collapse in July 2006 when negotiations were suspended
"primarily because of broad disagreements over agriculture." 27 Thus,
as to agricultural subsidies, international trade law reverted to the
framework that announced in the Uruguay Round and Congress
approved in the mid-1990s.
That said, it had always been unclear whether the Uruguay
framework was sufficiently strong actually to penalize the United
States with trade sanctions for Congress's reintroduction of increased
agricultural subsidies. Although the New York Times chastised the
government in an editorial in 2004 entitled Those Illegal Farm
Subsidies,28 many experts believed that ambiguity in the text of the
Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture2 9 would "rarely permit
successful reining in by [the WTO's] dispute settlement panels of the
nearly $1 billion a day developed nations [were providing] to their
farmers."3 o
In 2004, however, two decisions issued by WTO dispute settle-
ment panels sent a warning shot to the business-as-usual system of
agricultural commodity subsidies. The first decision, arising from a
complaint brought by Brazil against the United States for American
subsidies on upland cotton, found that the United States had exceeded
the amount of subsidies it was allowed under the Agreement on Agri-
culture.3 1 The second decision, from a Brazilian complaint against the
European Union ("EU") for the EU's level of subsidies to domestic
sugar producers, found that the EU had exceeded its internationally
applicable limits on commodity subsidies. Not only did these deci-
sions surprise many observers, but they triggered the WTO's often-
cumbersome enforcement mechanism - under which the complaining
26 Id at 1022-23.
27 Id. at 1023.
28 See Editorial, Those Illegal Farm Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at
A20.
29 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 43 (1999), 1867
U.N.T.S. 410.
30 Stephen J. Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies
Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 287, 289 (2005).
31 See Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 348,
WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
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state is authorized to impose tariffs on exports (of any kind) from the
offending state. These actions signaled that the WTO was taking se-
riously the world's commitment to phase out certain types of agricul-
tural crop subsidies.
In September 2009, the WTO authorized Brazil to retaliate against
the American cotton subsidies with almost $300 million in trade sanc-
tions - the second-largest retaliation ever approved by the WTO.
Brazil has indicated informally its interest in levying these sanctions
against the U.S. services and intellectual property export sectors.32
Yet the impact of international trade law on American crop subsidies
may be just beginning.33 In the words of two prominent commenta-
tors, "The Sugar Panel's finding that below-cost exports of an agricul-
tural product may [violate American obligations under the WTO] . . .
makes the United States rice, corn, soybeans, and other commodities
programs vulnerable to dispute challenge." 34
In fact, the new trade rules change the incentive mix for farmers
in another way, as well. In addition to the newly brandished "stick,"
the WTO's new rules on agricultural subsidies also contain a "carrot."
The Agreement on Agriculture requires member nations to reduce
farm support but differentiates among types of support based upon
each subsidy's trade-distorting features. The most trade-distorting,
and thus least favored, types of support are known as "Amber Box"
subsidies; which Congress authorized under the 2002 Farm Bill.35
However, two other types of subsidies are considered by the Agree-
ment on Agriculture to be less trade-distorting: "Blue Box" subsidies,
which are made for farmers who agree to limit production; and
"Green Box" subsidies, which include payments made under "envi-
ronmental and conservation programs."36 For our purposes, it is sig-
nificant that payments made to farmers that reward them for their ste-
wardship of their lands' carbon-sequestration properties - whether
made under Blue Box or Green Box types of programs - continue
32 See Marc Chandler, Will WTO Sanctions End Farm Subsidies?, Seeking
Alpha, Sept. 3, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/159760-will-sanctions-end-
farm-subsidies.
33 See European Communities - Export Subsidies on Sugar, Reports of the
Panels P 8.3, WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266R, & WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004), affid
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AD/R, &
WT/DS283/ABIR (Apr. 28, 2005).
34 Powell & Schmitz, supra note 30, at 290.
3s See Porterfield, supra note 21, at 1006 ("Payments authorized under the
2002 Farm Bill that qualify as Amber Box subsidies include counter-cyclical pay-
ments and marketing loan program payments.").
36 Id. at 1007 (citing the Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2).
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under the new international trade rules, just as the deficiency pay-
ments tied to production are being limited.
The significance of these developments, therefore, is this: the cur-
rent system of domestic agricultural subsidies has received an endo-
genous shock, the sort of shock that, played out into the foreseeable
future, might very well open American farmers to the financial
necessity of re-imagining the ways in which they make business and
operating decisions.
II. BIOFUELS: A CAUTIONARY TALE
In recent years, policy entrepreneurs have claimed that biofuels,
such as corn-based ethanol, represent another way in which the gov-
ernment could enlist farmers to aid in GHG reduction. In fact, this
claim has proven to be contentious. For our purposes, however, one
need not definitively resolve whether corn-based ethanol is on balance
a good thing. Instead, biofuels serve more as a cautionary tale, as
their short history reflects an inability to escape the distorting influ-
ence of special-interest politics, even in the design and refinement of
next-generation environmental programs and initiatives.
To be fair to biofuels, society's interest in them did not grow
exclusively, or even mostly, out of concern with GHGs. After the gas
shortages occasioned by the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s,
Congress enacted the Energy Tax Act of 1978 offering a federal sub-
sidy for "gasohol" to push the country toward energy independence.
Despite increases in this federal subsidy over the ensuing years, the
price competitiveness of ethanol remained uncertain because collaps-
ing oil prices in the mid-1980s presented consumers with a world
awash in cheap fossil fuels.38 In the late 1980s, however, demand for
ethanol came from another direction. A push for oxygenated fuels
arose to control conventional air pollutants, which in turn increased
demand for ethanol as a fuel additive. The federal Clean Air Act of
1990 reinforced this regulatory signal. Moreover, as demand began to
decrease for methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"), one of the coun-
try's most common (and dangerous) fuel additives, 39 demand
3 See Bruce A. McCarl & Fred 0. Boadu, Bioenergy and US. Renewable
Fuels Standards: Law, Economic, Policy/Climate Change and Implementation Con-
cerns, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 43, 45 (2009) (noting that gasohol is primarily corn-
based ethanol as a component of gasoline).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 45-46 (adding that MTBE was banned completely in June 2006).
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expanded for ethanol as an additive and peaked in 2006 when the use
of MTBE as an additive virtually ceased.40
At that point, growers began planting more acres with corn and a
mini-industry in biorefineries blossomed. Indeed, it seemed that corn-
based ethanol might have done most of what we had asked of it. The
ethanol industry could properly claim that ethanol supplied more fuel
"than the oil we import from Iran, Iraq, or Venezuela . .. [with] only
Canada and Saudi Arabia supply[ing] more."4 1 And the net public
health benefits of ethanol as an aromatic octane enhancer in gasoline
seemed considerable.42
By the mid- to late-1990s, however, corn-based ethanol began to
draw increasing scrutiny, including scrutiny from a climate-change
perspective. From an energy-independence and GHG perspective, an
accounting problem was raised: factoring in the gasoline needed in the
field to grow the corn and that needed in ethanol's synthesis, ethanol
might not significantly cut fossil fuel use and, under certain condi-
43tions, might even have a negative net energy balance. From a
broader environmental perspective, environmental concerns arose
over secondary effects such as increased pesticide and fertilizer load-
ings, increased use of groundwater for irrigation, and the conversion
into corn of marginal (but ecologically valuable) farmland from the
federal conservation reserve program." From the international food
supply perspective, ethanol-related demand had so raised the interna-
tional price of corn that it sparked "tortilla riots" in Mexico City.45
40 Id. at 46.
41 ETHANOL ACROSS AM., ISSUE BRIEF: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION 1 (2009), http://www.ne-ethanol.org/pdf/enviromental
impact ethanol 2009.pdf
a Indeed, environmental regulators began to imagine reductions of eighty
percent of the hazardous aromatics in gasoline by increasing the ethanol content of
gasoline to twenty-five percent (a change, however, that would require many more
flexible-fuel vehicles on the road or an expansion of warranty protection by car manu-
facturers for existing engines). See Douglas G. Tiffany, Economic and Environmen-
tal Impacts of U.S. Corn Ethanol Production and Use, 5 REGIONAL ECON. DEv. 42, 44
(2009).
43 Id. at 45 (estimating the net energy balance of ethanol at 1.25 to 1.0, a
result that would go even lower in a year of poor corn yields when the same amount
of energy produced less crop); David Pimentel & Tad W. Patzek, Ethanol Production
Using Corn, Switchgrass, and Wood; Biodiesel Production Using Soybean and Sun-
flower, 14 NATURAL RESOURCES RES. 65, 66 (2005) (corn-based ethanol actually used
twenty-nine percent more (fossil fuel) energy than it produced).
4 See Jeni Lamb et al., Adding Biofuel to the Fire: A Sustainability Perspec-
tive on Energy Policy in the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, SUSTAINABLE
DEv. L. & POL'Y 36,40 (2008).
45 Michael Grunwald, The Clean Energy Scam, TIME, Mar. 27, 2008.
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The United Nations World Food Programme referred to this increased
demand as the "silent tsunami," that "threaten[ed] to plunge more than
100 million people on every continent into hunger." 46  In the U.S.
farm belt, higher corn prices were draining the profit margins of poul-
try-, swine-, and cattle-producers. 47
Soon the accumulated weight of these concerns collided with the
increasing political power of the ethanol lobby. At first, the ethanol
lobby seemed to carry the day. The 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills created
numerous new biofuel research and development programs, adding to
the web of federal ethanol subsidies.48 A few years later, the Energy
Policy Act of 200549 created a Renewable Fuels Standard ("RFS")
that mandated significant increases in biofuel volumes to be used in
the country's fuel supply, beginning at four billion gallons in 2006
and almost doubling to seven and a half billion gallons by 2012.o
In 2007, however, faced with mounting evidence that some biofu-
els might not have the energy savings and greenhouse-gas qualities
that had been touted, Congress reassessed having corn-based ethanol
as the country's biofuel of choice. In the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 ("EISA"),s1 Congress laid the foundation for
linking biofuels and GHG-emissions reduction. Although the EISA
extended the Renewable Fuels Standard to increase the amount of
biofuel in the nation's fuel supply, 52 the EISA required all new biofu-
els to be "renewable." The EISA defines renewable as "meeting or
exceeding a minimum 20% percent GHG reduction threshold" over
fossil fuels. The EISA, moreover, created separate, ambitious man-
46 Press Release, United Nations World Food Programme, WFP Says High
Food Prices a Silent Tsunami, Affecting Every Continent (Apr. 22, 2008), available
at http://www.wfp.org/node/195.
47 See Lamb et al., supra note 44, at 37.
48 See McCarl & Boadu, supra note 37, at 47 ("[T]he 1996 Farm Bill empha-
sized the need for research and development directed toward . . . agriculture-based
bioenergy feedstocks .... [T]he 2002 Farm Bill established new programs and grants
for the purchase of bio-based products to support development of biorefineries.").
49 Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005).
5o See McCarl & Boadu, supra note 37, at 48-49.
s1 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492.
52 Id. at § 202(a)(2)(B)(i)(1) (extending the amount of biofuels from 9 billion
gallons in 2008 to a startling 36 billion gallons by 2022).
s3 See OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA PROPOSES NEW REGULATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL RENEWABLE FUEL
STANDARD PROGRAM FOR 2010 AND BEYOND 3 (2009), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/
renewablefuels/420fD9023.pdf [hereinafter EPA NEW REGULATIONS] (the EISA
"established new renewable fuel categories and eligibility requirements, including
setting the first ever mandatory GHG reduction thresholds for the various categories
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dates for "advanced" biofuelS5 4 (such as "cellulosic" biofuel)55 that
could obtain GHG-emissions reductions in the fifty percent range56
and specified that most of the nation's dramatic increase in biofuel
capacity would come from "advanced" biofuels."
In the EISA, Congress delegated to the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") the all-important task of calculating the full GHG-
emission qualities of biofuels. The statute instructed EPA to make its
determinations using an especially comprehensive "lifecycle analysis"
("LCA") that would account for "the aggregate quantity of green-
house gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant indi-
rect emissions from land use changes) . . . related to the full lifecycle,
including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution .
. . . [of each biofuel]."'58  This delegation was extremely important,
and it did not augur well for corn-based ethanol. Pound for pound,
ethanol delivers only two-thirds of the energy content of the gasoline
it replaces, thus requiring the growth, transport, distillation, and
distribution of more ethanol than gasoline.59 When factoring in the
fossil fuels needed to plant, till, harvest, transport, and refine all of the
necessary corn - throughout the life cycle of the fuel - the net energy
savings and greenhouse-gas reductions of ethanol begin to shrink.
Indeed, some ethanol systems, such as those that used coal-powered
refineries, have negative energy balances; these types of ethanol
"pathways" actually worsen our dependence on foreign oil and emit
more GHGs into the atmosphere than the fossil fuels they replace.o
of fuels").
54 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 § 201(1)(B), P.L. No.
I 10-140, 121 Stat 1492 (2007).
ss See McCarl & Boadu, supra note 37, at 49-50. "Cellulosic biofuel" is
defined in the Act as "renewable fuel derived from any cellulose, hemicellulose, or
lignin that is derived from renewable biomass and that has lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions . . . that are at least 60 percent less than the baseline lifecycle greenhouse
gas emissions." The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 § 201(1)(E),
P.L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat 1492 (2007). "Biodiesel" is defined in the Act as "renew-
able fuel that is biodiesel ... and that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions .... that
are at least 50 percent less than baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions."
§ 201(l)(3).
56 See EPA NEW REGULATIONS, supra note 53, at 3,
57 See McCarl & Boadu, supra note 37, at 49 (cellulosic biofuel volume was
to increase under the EISA from 0.1 billion gallons in 2010 to 16 billion gallons in
2022).
58 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 § 201, L. No. 110-
140, 121, Stat. 1492, 1520 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)); see EPA NEW
REGULATIONS, supra note 53, at 4.
s9 See Grunwald, supra note 45, at 53-54.
6 See Tiffany, supra note 42, at 45-48; see also Stephen D. Cook, EPA
Proposes Rule on Which Biofuels Qualify Under Renewable Fuels Standard, 40
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These environmental concerns prompted a growing awareness
that the biofuels industry needed to improve and that its future be-
longed to advanced biofuels rather than to simple expansion of corn-
based ethanol. President Obama instructed Secretary of Agriculture
Tom Vilsack to use funds from the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 20086 to finance mechanisms that could reduce emissions
from ethanol plants and to help finance facilities that could produce
ethanol from biomass, rather than from corn. 6 2 The President also
directed the Department of Energy to spend over $750 million from
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Stimulus Bill)63 to
accelerate biofuels research and development.6
In Spring 2009, federal and state regulators dealt a huge regulato-
ry blow to many of the traditional pathways for producing corn-based
ethanol. The state of California, and the EPA, independently deter-
mined that most corn-based ethanol was not a low-carbon fuel. Spe-
cifically, regulators using LCA found that the already-thin energy-
and GHG-benefits of some corn-based ethanol systems could actually
be outweighed by the indirect effects of the increased, worldwide corn
production they caused. Specifically, the agencies found that rising
demand for corn caused by ethanol production led to increased land-
clearing overseas and farming on such non-agricultural lands as neo-
tropical rainforests, releasing indirectly the GHG stored there. 6 5 The
California Air Resources Board ("CARB") made its decision pursuant
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1047 (May 8, 2009) (corn ethanol produced in a plant powered by
coal has cumulative emissions that are thirteen percent higher than gasoline whereas
those produced with biomass heat reduce emissions, at least when calculated using a
100-year-time frame).
61 See H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
62 Id.
63 See H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
6 Cook, supra note 60, at 1047.
65 See Carolyn Whetzel, State Adopts Low-Carbon Fuel Standard in Move to
Lower Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1108 (May 1, 2009) (de-
scribing California's use of indirect emissions in life-cycle analysis of low-carbon
fuels); Cook, supra note 60, at 1047. If one considers merely the direct emissions of
GHG from gasoline and corn, gasoline has direct carbon emissions of approximately
ninety-five grams per mega-joule of energy used to produce it and corn ethanol has
direct emissions of approximately sixty-eight grams per mega-joule; the CARB rule
found that the indirect land use (deforestation) effects of the corn ethanol market
added another thirty grams per mega-joule on the ethanol side, making corn ethanol a
net GHG contributor even before adding in the other indirect GHG effects of corn
ethanol under a full lifecycle analysis. See Cole Gustafson, New Energy Economics:
Markets for
Traditional Corn Ethanol Narrowing, N.D. ST. U. AGRIC. CoMM., Mar. 26, 2009,
http://www.ag.ndsu.edu/news/columns/biofuels-economics/new-energy-econom
ics-markets-for-traditional-corn-ethanol-narrowing.
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to the state's Global Warming Solutions Act of 200666 which sought
to cut GHG emissions in California to 1990 levels by 2020.7 The
EPA's decision was made pursuant to its mandate under the 2007
EISA statute to use LCA ("including significant indirect emissions
from land use changes") in developing the EISA's Renewable Fuel
Standard.68
Before considering the ethanol industry's response to these devel-
opments, it is worth noting that, in many ways, the agencies' LCA
confirmed the environmental case that had been building only against
the most energy- and land-intensive types (pathways) of ethanol pro-
duction. Not all ethanol production, and certainly not all biofuel pro-
duction, was adversely affected by the agencies' decisions. One spo-
kesperson for CARB, for example, noted that seven out of eleven
pathways for corn ethanol passed muster under California's low-
carbon-fuel standard.69 Indeed, some environmentalists complained
that the regulators had used various types of regulatory accounting
"gimmicks," such as a hundred-year time frame rather than a thirty-
year time frame, to improve the "renewability" profile of most biofu-
els.70 Companies producing advanced biofuels, which fared better
than corn-based ethanol under these regulations, "applauded" the reg-
ulatory developments and claimed that the new regulations would
"provide the confidence needed to attract investors." 7' Both the
CARB and EPA proposals were consistent with federal actions to spur
advancement and innovation in the biofuels industry. 72 These propos-
als were also consistent with the generally accepted convention in
international climate regulation that one must consider "leakage," the
effect of GHG-reducing action taken in one part of the world that can
lead to offsetting GHG-increasing actions in another geographic loca-
tion. 73  Finally, both regulatory decisions were consistent with a
66 California Global Warning Solutions Act of 2006, Assem. B. No. 32 §
38501(h) (2006).
67 See Whetzel, supra note 65, at 1108.
68 Cook, supra note 60, at 1047 (describing EPA's mandate as to indirect
emissions, life cycle analysis, and the RFS under the EISA).
69 See id. ("CARB spokesman Stanley Young told BNA May I that 'not all
ethanols are created equal' . . . [and] that those using "natural gas or biomass to dry
distillers grain .... instead of coal . . . have a definite and specific role to play to meet
the [low-carbon-fuel] standard.").
70 Id. ("The analysis based on a 30-year time frame shows about half the
greenhouse gas reduction as the 100-year time frame, except for fuels made of
cornstalks or other cellulosic biomass, which were about the same.").
71 See Whetzel, supra note 65, at 1108.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 62, 64.
7 See, e.g., Philip M. Fearnside, Carbon Benefits from Amazonian Forest
Reserves: Leakage Accounting and the Value of Time, 14 MITIGATION & ADAPTION
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significant body of scientific and economic literature finding that
higher ethanol-induced prices for corn in one part of the world can
lead to deforesting or increased cultivation (with attendant increased
GHG emissions) in other parts of the world.7 4
Thus, in light of the relative modesty of the regulators' science-
backed proposals, the corn-ethanol industry's full-throated attack on
the California and EPA regulatory decisions may be the most notable
example yet of the dangers that special-interest politics can present in
shaping GHG regulation. The industry's response took two forms.
The first was the increasingly common strategy of attacking regulators
for junk science and zealotry. Within days of CARB's proposed rule
in April 2009, the ethanol industry had attacked it as a "scientifically
unsound penalty" and successfully demanded that CARB create a
second expert panel to review evidence over the next eighteen
months.75 Within days of EPA's proposal in May 2009, the ethanol
industry claimed that it would be vindicated by a properly conducted
"scientific peer review" of the indirect land-use component of the
agency's ethanol LCA.76 These charges were countered when EPA
released, in August 2009, several peer-review documents in which
scientists expressed their "general satisfaction" with the scientific
underpinnings of EPA's proposal, leaving the industry to claim that
the peer reviewers were "biased,"78 while simultaneously magnifying
several methodological comments made by the peer reviewers to ar-
gue that the peer review had proven EPA wrong.79
Separately, the industry launched attacks on the regulators'
"transparency." Industry groups demanded release of some models
STRATEGIES GLOBAL CHANGE 557, 557-58 (2009) ("Of primary importance [in devel-
oping GHG policy] . .. is the accounting for carbon benefits of Amazon forest re-
serves, especially the losses to 'leakage,' or the effects on carbon emissions that occur
outside of a mitigation project as a result of the project activity.").
74 See, e.g., Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels
Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319
SCIENCE 1238, 1238-40 (2008).
7s California May Revisit Land-Use GHG Impacts in Clean Fuels Rule, 3
CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 17, Apr. 27, 2009.
76 Ethanol Industry Eyes RFS Peer Review to Boost Fuel's GHG Benefits, 3
CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 19, May 11, 2009, at 2.
n7 Stephen D. Cook, Peer Review Generally Supports EPA Analysis of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Biofuels, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1047 (Aug. 14,
2009).
Ethanol Industry Claims Bias in EPA Peer Review of Biofuel Gas, 3
CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 32, Aug. 10, 2009.
79 See Cook, supra note 77, at 1047 ("House Agriculture Committee Chair-
man Collin Peterson (D-Minn.) said the peer reviews showed the weaknesses of the
EPA modeling.").
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that the agencies had used in their regulatory decisionmakingo even
though the attackers simultaneously argued that the agencies should
broadly protect industry trade secrets when responding to environ-
mentalists' demands for other information in the agencies' posses-
sion.8 1 In short, the industry attacked the agencies' proposed LCA
with the sort of full-court press in the name of "good science" that has
come to characterize rulemaking in the new "subterranean" adminis-
trative law.82
Moreover, lest this subterranean attack fail, the ethanol industry
and its allies in Congress began a more overt, and more overtly politi-
cal, attack on the application of LCA to ethanol. The American Clean
Energy and Security Act ("ACES"), H.R. 2454, had been introduced
on May 15, 2009 by Representatives Henry Waxman and Edward
Markey.83 ACES is widely regarded as the most significant piece of
GHG legislation in a generation. Yet it was introduced precisely as
the CARB and EPA regulatory proposals on biofuel LCA had at-
tracted intense, special-interest scrutiny. It was not long before these
two developments merged. Representative Collin Peterson, Chair of
the House Agriculture Committee, introduced legislation on May 14,
2009, that simply would have forbidden EPA from considering indi-
rect land-use change in its implementation of the RFS. 84 After ACES
was introduced the following day, Peterson announced that he would
85
oppose ACES unless Peterson's concerns about LCA were met.
Thereafter, as the bill's sponsors did not seem to have enough support
to pass ACES, Peterson and the agricultural bloc he represented found
themselves with significant political leverage. In late June 2009, Rep-
so E.g., Steven D. Cook, Industry Group Seeks Release of Models Used by
EPA for Renewable Fuels Standard, 40 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1291 (June 5, 2009); Cali-
fornia Low-Carbon Fuel Rule Raises Transparency Concerns, 3 CARBON CONTROL
NEWS No. 32, Aug. 10, 2009.
81 California Low-Carbon Fuel Rule Raises Transparency Concerns, supra
note 80.
82 See Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of
Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 227, 235-37.
83 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 111th Cong.
(2009).
8 See Climate Bill Slated for House Floor Vote; Waxman, Other Chairmen
Reach Agreements, 40 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1 (June 26, 2009) [hereinafter Climate Bill]
("Peterson said EPA would also be barred from considering whether ethanol produc-
tion leads to international land use changes that may trigger increases global green-
house gas emissions. The agreement . . . will defer a decision on that issue for at least
five years while . . . the issue is studied by EPA, USDA, and the Energy Depart-
ment.").
85 Id
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resentatives Waxman and Peterson announced an agreement whereby
ACES would forbid EPA for five years from considering whether
ethanol production led to increased GHG emissions from international
land-use changes.
Even more aggressive bills have been introduced in the Senate, by
farm-belt Republicans and Democrats alike, which would forbid EPA
outright from ever considering indirect GHG effects in its LCA of
biofuels.87 Other legislative proposals sought simply to "deem" corn
ethanol an "advanced" biofuel." At this point, it remains unclear
whether this political pressure will prevail. In September 2009,
Senator Tom Harkin, then-Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee,
drafted an amendment to EPA's 2010 spending bill that would have
barred the use of funds to consider indirect effects on international
land use in EPA's implementation of the RF. 8 9 The amendment was
withdrawn after EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson wrote Senator Har-
kin on September 24, 2009, that the Agency agreed that there might
be "significant uncertainties associated with . . . the estimate of indi-
rect land use change" and promised that EPA would work to "quantify
the uncertainty." 90 EPA, however, reiterated that it was "important to
take into account indirect emissions from biofuels when looking at the
lifecycle emissions as required by the EISA."91 As of this writing, the
political tug-of-war over ethanol LCA is still unfolding.
86 See id. ("Peterson said EPA would also be barred from considering wheth-
er ethanol production leads to international land use changes that may trigger increas-
es global greenhouse gas emissions. The agreement . .. will defer a decision on that
issue for at least five years while . . . the issue is studied by EPA, USDA, and the
Energy Department"); see also Steven D. Cook, Jackson Touts Benefits to Agriculture
in House Energy, Climate Legislation, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1757 (July 24, 2009)
("In addition, the agreement would repeal a requirement in the Energy Independence
and Security Act . . . for EPA to analyze indirect greenhouse gas emissions arising
overseas from the production of ethanol in the United States.").
87 Thune Bill Allows Ethanol Makers to Sidestep GHG Cuts, 3 CARBON
CONTROL NEWS No. 19, May 11, 2009 ("[T]hune's legislation would instruct EPA to
focus on direct lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in setting its standards.").
88 Harkin Plan to Ease EPA GHG Rules Heightens Biofuels Industry Ten-
sion, 3 CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 32, Aug. 10, 2009 ("Senate Agriculture Commit-
tee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-IA) is weighing modifications to the greenhouse gas
(GHG) provisions in EPA's renewable fuel standard (RFS) to allow corn ethanol to
qualify as an advanced biofuel .... ).
89 See Ben Geman, Biofuels: EPA Rule Will Reflect 'Uncertainty' on Indirect
Emissions, Fending off Amendment, ENv'T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 24, 2009,
http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/print/2009/09/24/2.
90 See id.; see also Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator, to Senator Tom Harkin, (Sept. 23, 2009) (on file with Health
Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine).
9 Letter from Lisa P. Jackson to Senator Tom Harkin, supra note 90.
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The bottom line is that the newest generation of climate-change
legislation already has proven susceptible to the distortions of special-
interest politics, notwithstanding the differences in political-party
control. In what might be a harbinger for agriculture's role in an
emerging carbon-offset market, special-interest politics has affected
(although hopefully not trumped) at least some of the climate-change
science on which the legitimacy of the country's biofuel regime de-
pends.
Ill. THE OTHER SHOE DROPPING: AGRICULTURAL
CARBON OFFSETS, POLITICS, AND REGULATORY
DESIGN
The tussle over biofuels only foreshadowed the outsized role agri-
culture was to take when the House of Representatives passed ACES.
Specifically, in Summer 2009, this political pressure explained the
emergence of agricultural "offsets" in political and public-policy
debates on the ACES bill.
At the level of regulatory design, the attraction of offsets in gen-
eral is easy to explain. The regulatory centerpiece of ACES is a "cap-
and-trade" system in which increasingly stringent GHG limitations
(the "cap") is imposed largely on the energy-producing sector of the
economy with firms within the sector retaining latitude to arrange
cost-effective measures to meet their lower-GHG obligations (the
"trade"). 9 2 A regulated firm within the cap can arrange such trades
with other, similarly- regulated firms ("allowance trading") and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, with unregulated firms in sectors of the econ-
omy outside of the cap ("offsets"). 93 Although, as explained below,
offsets present certain challenges not found in allowance trading, they
also offer two key advantages. First, by expanding GHG-reduction
possibilities outside of the cap, offsets promise lower GHG emissions,
sooner, than would exist in a world restricted only to allowance
trading.94 Second, by expanding the supply of GHG-reduction possi-
92 See, e.g., Climate Bill, supra note 84, at I (Title III authorizes a cap-and-
trade program to curb U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17 percent by 2020 from 2005
levels).
9 See, e.g., Laurie A. Ristino, It's Not Easy Being Green: Reflections on the
American Carbon Offset Market, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & PoL'Y 34, 34 (2008)
("Under a cap-and-trade regime, a limited percentage of a regulated industry's emis-
sion reduction requirement may be met with the purchase of carbon offsets. Offsets
are different from on-site reductions because they mitigate regulated source emissions
by reducing emissions through an unregulated sector GHG reduction project.").
94 Id. at 37 ("Carbon offsets have the potential to play an effective, interim
role as part of an overall comprehensive federal framework that uses multiple strate-
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bilities, offsets can reduce the price by which lower-GHG emissions
can be achieved' - thereby easing the economy's transition to a low-
er-carbon future and, perhaps, political opposition to GHG legislation
by those who see in it only higher energy costs caused by a
cap-and-"tax" scheme.96
Continuing at the level of regulatory design, offsets also present a
set of unique dangers. Because a regulated firm within the cap can
continue to emit a certain level of GHGs, so long as it acquires a
corresponding amount of offsetting reductions, an offset program
exhibits the qualities of a zero-sum game.97 If the hoped-for emission
reductions from the offset project fail to materialize while GHG emis-
sions from industrial sources within the cap continue, there will not be
any net reduction in the overall amount of carbon emissions.9 Such
incidences can absolutely cripple the legitimacy of the cap-and-trade
scheme, masking the continued emissions of GHGs, at levels beyond
the target policymakers had deemed acceptable, with the exchange of
money for what in reality would be ineffective trades. 9 Two com-
mon problems with offset integrity are especially noted in the public
policy literature. The first problem involves paying for an offset
project that would have happened anyway. This "additionality" prob-
gies to address climate change.").
95 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE USE OF OFFSETS TO REDUCE
GREENHOUSE GASES 8 (2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/104xx/docl0497/
08-03-Offsets.pdf ("The cost savings to the economy generated by offsets could be
substantial. CBO estimates that between 2012 and 2050 average annual savings from
offsets could be about 70 percent under [ACES].").
96 See, e.g., Sarah Palin, The 'Cap and Tax' Dead End, WASH. POST, July 14,
2009, at A17; Editorial, The Cap and Tax Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2009, at
A12.
9 See Written Testimony of Michael Wara to the Subcomm. on Energy &
Env't, U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning the Role of Offsets in Climate
Legislation 2 (Mar. 5, 2009) (copy on file with author) ("A carbon offset market, if
perfect in both design and implementation, is a zero-sum game. Emissions are re-
duced at carbon offset projects. These emissions reductions then allow firms with
compliance obligations to emit more than they otherwise would and at a lower per ton
cost.").
98 Id. ("If, however, design or oversight is imperfect, with some offset
projects securing credit for reductions that do not represent real alterations to their
baseline emissions, getting paid to do what they would have done in any case, then
emissions will be unchanged outside of the cap but higher within the cap.").
9 See Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on Interna-
tional Carbon Offsets 8 (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper
No. 74, 2008) ("Our argument is that the theoretical benefits of lower costs and
broader engagement of developing countries through the extensive use of offsets are
an illusion. They are based on the assumption that it is possible to administer an
offsets system so that it rewards only bona fide reductions. This assumption is valid
for only a fraction of the real offsets market.").
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lem means that emissions would remain unchanged outside of the cap
but higher within the cap, resulting in a failure to achieve net reduc-
tions in overall GHGs. 00 The second problem entails paying for an
offset project that in fact merely shifted the location of GHG emis-
sions. This "leakage" problem means that emissions would merely
change location outside of the cap but be higher within, again result-
ing in a failure to achieve net reductions in overall GHGs. 01
IV. AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY OFFSETS:
POSSIBILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
With these design principles in mind, it is certainly important to
note that legitimate offsets from agriculture and forestry can exist.
Indeed, some of these possibilities are relatively straightforward. For
example, animal manure lagoons emit methane into the atmosphere, a
gas with heat-trapping qualities twenty-one times those of carbon
dioxide. 102  This GHG can be reduced, however, by systems that
capture and burn methane, sometimes for on-farm use as power in lieu
of other GHG-causing power sources.103 Projects that induce the use
of such systems do not suffer from additionality problems because,
currently, such systems are both expensive and relatively rare. Hence
adopting such systems would constitute a change from the business-
as-usual approach to manure management."1" Similarly, a leakage
problem would not exist; and one manure lagoon's methane reduction
would not lead, directly or indirectly, to increased methane emissions
elsewhere.
Other types of agricultural offsets might share similar attributes.
For example, methane emissions directly from livestock (caused by
enteric fermentation within the normal digestive processes of rumi-
100 See, e.g., Wara, supra note 97.
101 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 95, at 4 ("Offsets would need
to be credited in a way that accounted for leakage in the form of higher emissions in
other locations or sectors of the economy as a result of the offset activity.") (emphasis
in original).
102 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3 n.9.
103 See Nicholas Smallwood, Note, The Role of U.S. Agriculture in a Com-
prehensive Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 936,
940 (2008) ("manure management projects are a great opportunity for agricultural
involvement in climate change mitigation; they are relatively straightforward; they
provide additional non-GHG environmental benefits; and they provide an opportunity
for landowners to reduce their use of fossil fuels").
1" JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 7-8 (noting that initial capital costs of an anae-
robic digester ranges from $500,000 to $1 million, causing their adoption, despite
federal and state cost-sharing programs, to remain low - "accounting for only 1% of
operations nationwide").
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nant animals) may be reduced by changes in animal feed, adopted
precisely for this purpose.'os Similarly, nitrous oxide emissions from
fertilizer use may be reduced by changing the timing or amount of
fertilizer applications;10 6 such changes could offer extra GHG benefits
because nitrous oxide has 310 times the heat-trapping qualities of car-
bon dioxide. 107  These offsets are potentially attractive because, as
with the adoption of methane-capturing systems, they do not present
immediate problems with additionality and/or leakage. That said,
some scientific questions remain open, regarding our ability to quanti-
fy the amounts of GHG emissions any of these offsets might in fact
produce. 08 Enforcement and administrative questions also remain,
regarding error or fraud in implementation at thousands of different
farm sites.' 09
But the major claims made about agricultural and forestry offsets
involve the possibilities they offer for carbon sequestration. Within
GHG-policy circles, the term, "carbon sequestration" refers to two
different processes. The first type of carbon sequestration, sometimes
also called "carbon capture and storage,""o refers to end-of-pipe tech-
nologies at fossil-fuel power plants (especially coal-fired plants) that
separate carbon dioxide from the waste-gas emission stream, then
process and inject it underground for permanent or very long-term
burial."' Currently, such technologies are experimentalll 2 and are
probably at least a decade or more from widespread use." 3
105 Id. at 4 ("Methane emissions from livestock operations occur as part of the
normal digestive process in ruminant animals .... Higher feed effectiveness is asso-
ciated with lower emissions.").
106 See Smallwood, supra note 103, at 939 ("Farmers can decrease nitrous
oxide emissions through the implementation of soil management practices - in order
to improve the amount, timing, and placement of nitrogen-rich fertilizers.").
107 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3 n.9.
"o See, e.g., D. Giltrap et al., DNDC: A Process-based Model of Greenhouse
Gas Fluxes from Agricultural Soils, 136 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS ENv'T 292, 295-96,
298 (2010) (reporting a model that finds significant differences in nitrous oxide
emissions depending on soil moisture and other variables, noting for example that
"Chinese farmers have started gaining [carbon] credits by incorporating more crop
residue in their soils or resuming traditional manure fertilizer [but] when [the model]
was used to simulate the effects of these practices, soil [nitrous oxide and [methane]
increased across major agricultural regions in China.").
109 See infra text accompanying notes 157-161 for discussion of mechanisms
addressed to administrability problems such as these.
110 See, e.g., Howard Herzog & Dan Golomb, Carbon Capture and Storage
from Fossil Fuel Use, in MASS. INST. TECH. ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY 277 (Cutler J.
Cleveland ed., 2004), available at http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/enclyclopedia
of energyarticle.pdf (describing the processes of capture and storage).
"' See, e.g., Christine MacDonald, Pipe Dreams: The Question of Clean
Coal, 20 E-THE ENVIRONMENTAL MAGAZINE 29 (Sept/Oct 2009) (generally describing
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The second type of sequestration involves changes in land-use
patterns that increase the amount of carbon stored in biomass and
soils. This type of sequestration is ubiquitous and its near-term ex-
pansion more feasible. The most commonly referenced form of bio-
mass storage involves forests. In the United States alone, forests se-
quester 200 Targograms ("Tg")14 of atmospheric carbon annually,
mostly through the photosynthesis involved in the growth of trees,
with the potential to increase this by fifty to one hundred percent (to
100-200 Tg/year), both through maintaining larger amounts of
acreage in permanent forests as well as through such forestry practices
as lengthening the rotation period in tree harvesting."' 5 In compari-
son, carbon sequestered in agricultural soils ("soil C") is currently
estimated at only 11 to 21 Tg/year, but with the potential to increase
six- to ten-fold (to 75-208 Tg/year) through such management tech-
niques as reduced tillage, grazing land management/pasture improve-
ment, livestock management, and manure management.116
It is worth pausing on forestry sequestration for a moment to
appreciate how special-interest politics can even distort one of the
more promising tools in GHG control. When experts allude to se-
questered carbon in "agriculture and forestry," these experts usually
are emphasizing mostly forestry. One study estimated that agricultur-
al sequestration in the United States currently accounts for about 44
carbon capture and storage); Herzog & Golomb, supra note 110.
112 See, e.g., Matthew Campbell & Mike Anderson, Carbon Capture Needs
Decade of Subside, Harvard Researcher Says, BLOOMBERG, July 31, 2009, available
at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601072&sid=aSoAl7WaVcqs (ex-
plaining that it will take at least ten years to be technologically viable); Fereidoon P.
Sioshansi, De-carbonising Electricity Generation: It Won't be Easy, Cheap, Nor
Enough, 17 UTIL. POL'Y 217, 221 (2009) (many developments in carbon capture and
storage have yet to be achieved and, as of now, CCS technology has not been proven
to be technologically viable).
113 Sioshansi, supra note 112, at 221; see also Victor B. Flatt, Paving the
Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 211,
213-14 (2009) (discussing issues facing regulators as they devise necessary regulatory
regime for carbon capture and storage).
114 One targogram of carbon equals approximately 3,000 tons of carbon. See
Interview with Dr. Greg Gangi, Research Assistant Professor, Inst. for the Env't at
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
115 See Charles W. Rice, Introduction to Special Section on Greenhouse Gas-
es and Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry, 35 J. ENvTL. QUALITY
1338, 1338 (2006).
116 Id. at 1338-39; see also Debra L. Donahue, Livestock's Role in Climate
and Environmental Change, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 95, 99 (2008) (noting how graz-
ing cattle on marginal land adds relatively little to the food supply while, through
mechanical disturbance of soils and their ability to sequester carbon, reducing the
amount of carbon that could be sequestered).
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million metric tons of "carbon-dioxide equivalent" whereas forestry
accounts for over 1,100 million metric tons, meaning that ninety-five
percent of current sequestration in the United States takes place
through the "forestry" component.1 7 The flip side of this equation is
that deforestation, such as occurs when forests are converted to crop-
land, can contribute massively to GHG emissions. One source
estimates that worldwide deforestation accounts for eighteen to twen-
ty-five percent of global emissions."" In turn, there arises a well-
recognized leakage problem in the design of GHG offsets. Even when
forests in one area are set aside for their sequestration value, if market
demand for agricultural land is strong forests elsewhere will be
cleared and the land enlisted in what the market reflects to be its high-
est and best use. This leakage problem also has a "transboundary
aspect," meaning that excess demand for agricultural land in one
country will cause forests to be converted to cropland in others." 9
This phenomenon is "serious enough that a national carbon sequestra-
tion program could be largely dissipated over several decades." 20
Thus, when special-interest politics privileged corn-based ethanol in
the ACES biofuels provisions, by forbidding EPA from considering
the indirect, transboundary effects of corn ethanol on deforestation
rates in the tropics (conversion of forestland to cropland), it was un-
dermining the scientific understanding of leakage that is a crucial
element in the sort of legitimate offset program that ACES, in another
part of the legislation, was hoping to create.121
But setting aside offset-design issues in forestry, most experts
look to agricultural practices as holding the greater potential for in-
creased sequestration. In addition to changes in fertilizer' 2 2 and ran-
'17 JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 3 tbl.1.
118 Andrew W. Mitchell, et al., Forests First in the Fight Against Global
Climate Change, Global Canopy Programme (June 2007), http://www.globalcanopy
.org/themedia/file/PDFs/Forests%20First%2OJune%202007.pdf.
119 Kenneth R. Richards, A Brief Overview of Carbon Sequestration Econom-
ics and Policy, 33 ENVTL. MGMT. 545, 549 (2004) (citing Brent Sohngen & Robert
Mendelsohn, An Optimal Control Model of Forest Carbon Sequestration, 85 AM. J.
AGRIC. EcON. 448, 448-57 (2003)).
120 id.
121 See RENEE JOHNSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ESTIMATE OF CARBON
MITIGATION POTENTIAL FROM AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY ACTIVITIES 17 (2009),
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R40236.pdf [hereinafter ESTIMATE OF
CARBON MITIGATION] ("Biofuels policies and energy markets are likely to continue to
influence U.S. and global crop production patterns and land use, including decisions
regarding land retirement and other conservation-based land conversion (e.g., move-
ment to pasture/range, timberland, and developed uses), as well as various conserva-
tion practices.").
122 See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
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geland management,123 perhaps the most discussed set of sequestra-
tion measures involve crop-growing techniques such as no-till farm-
ing. Tilling soil for weed control and planting preparation had "been
fundamental to crop production for centuries."l24 Yet, among other
things, tilling also increases carbon oxidation and causes significant
releases ("fluxes") of GHGs from the soil.125 Contrariwise, reduced-
or no-till farming is often associated with reduced GHG fluxes from
soils.12 6 Since 1960, a no-till revolution has emerged as more farmers
utilize herbicides to control weeks, in lieu of tilling. As of 2002,
about twenty percent of U.S. acreage is planted using no-till tech-
niques, which is up from six percent in 1990. In fact, in many U.S.
agricultural counties, well over half of some crops are planted using
no-till farming.127 Overseas, some countries (e.g., Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay) produce fifty percent or more of their food by no-till me-
thods, whereas worldwide, no-till farming accounts only for five to
ten percent of food production. 12 8 It is often with increased use of no-
till farming that some scientists claim "there is no greater potential for
the sequestration [of] global carbon than the soil." 29  One study
found that conversion of seventy-six percent of U.S. cropland to "con-
servation tillage" could sequester "as much as 286-468 million metric
tons of carbon ("MMTCE") over 30 years," 3o while another study
123 See Donahue, supra note 116, at 100 ("According to one estimate, 'im-
proving management on 279 million acres of poorly managed ... rangelands [in the
U.S. alone] would sequester 11 million additional tons of carbon annually."') (quoting
Justin D. Derner et al., USDA-ARS Global Change Research on Rangelands and
Pasturelands, RANGELANDS, Oct. 2005, at 36, 36).
124 See C. John Baker & Keith E. Saxton, The "What" and Why" of No-
Tillage Farming, in NO-TILLAGE SEEDING [N CONSERVATION AGRICULTURE 1, 1 (C.
John Baker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
125 See, e.g., Don C. Reicosky & Keith E. Saxton, Reduced Environmental
Emissions and Carbon Sequestration, in No-TILLAGE SEEDING IN CONSERVATION
AGRICULTURE 257, 258 (C. John Baker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) ("The large gaseous
losses of soil carbon following mouldboard ploughing compared with relatively small
losses with no-tillage . . . .").
126 See infra notes 127-128.
127 See, e.g., Candace Pollock, No-Till Pioneers Leave Legacy in Ag. Produc-
tion, OHIO ST. U. EXTENSION, June 23, 2003, http://www.ohio4h.org/-news/story.php
?id=2558.
128 See Baker & Saxton, supra note 124, at 1.
129 D.J. Greenland, Carbon Sequestation in the Soil: Knowledge Gaps Indi-
cated by the Symposium Presentations, in SOIL PROCESSES AND THE CARBON CYCLE
591 (Rattan Lal et al., eds., 1998) (cited in Donahue, supra note 116, at 100).
130 Reicosky & Saxton, supra note 125, at 262 (citing J.S. Kern & M.G. John-
son, Conservation Tillage Impacts on National Soil and Atmospheric Carbon Levels,
57 SOIL SCI. Soc'Y Am. J. 200, 208-09 (1993)).
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estimated global sequestration rates as high as 4900 MMTCE by
2020."
No-till carbon sequestration has some potential advantages. Un-
like the leakage problems involved in forestry-based sequestration
(whereby acres locked up in forests in one area may contribute to
increased development pressure on forests in other areas), adopting a
GHG-friendly technique on land that is already being used in agricul-
ture does not create perverse land-conversion pressures elsewhere. In
addition, no-till farming has a variety of potential environmental co-
benefits, including: reduced GHG emissions from farm machinery
that otherwise would be used to till soil,13 2 reduced erosion of topsoil
caused by the breaking-up effect of tillage,13  reduced pesticide and
fertilizer run-off associated with tilled soils,' 34 and reduced agricultur-
al water consumption because of the increased moisture retention of
no-till soils.135
No-till carbon sequestration also has some potential problems. As
a matter of offset design, there is an additionality problem. Given the
no-till "revolution" already underway, reasons independent of GHG-
sequestration prompt farmers to adopt no-till methods. Therefore,
counting these methods as an offset does not really change what oth-
erwise would be the business-as-usual conversion to no-till outside of
the cap while allowing for continued or increased GHG emissions
inside the cap. 36  Indeed, to the extent some corn growers have
shifted to no-till, specifically to meet the RFS's renewability standards
for corn-based ethanol (reducing tractor emissions that would have
been needed to till mechanically), a second payment for these efforts,
as an "offset," would not add anything to the overall GHG balance.
U31 R. Lal, Residue Management, Conservation Tillage and Soil Restoration
for Mitigating Greenhouse Effect by C0 2-enrichment, 43 SoIL & TILLAGE REs. 81, 99
(1997).
132 See, e.g., Baker & Saxton, supra note 124, at 18-19 ("Tillage and harvest
operations account for the greatest proportion of fuel consumption within intensive
agricultural systems. [F]uel requirements using . . . no tillage are 78% [] of those
used for conventional systems .... ).
13 See, e.g., id. at 15 ("Soils relatively high in C, particularly with crop resi-
dues on the soil surface, very effectively increase soil organic matter and reduce soil
erosion loss.").
134 See, e.g., id at 16 ("Crop residues on the surface not only help hold soil
particles in place but keep associated nutrients and pesticides on the field.").
" See, e.g., id. at 15 ("[Flor some soil textures, for each 1% weight increase
in soil organic matter, the available water-holding capacity in the soil increased by
3.7% volume.").
136 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 95, at 4 (The UN's Clean Development
Mechanism requires projects seeking qualification as an offset to provide evidence of
barriers to implementation of the proposed technique.).
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This additional sale would also be a form of double-dipping, resulting
in the farmers' unjust enrichment.1 37 Moreover, no-till agriculture has
some direct and indirect environmental co-detriments. Directly, the
increased use of herbicides (such as atrazine) can pose environmental-
and human-health risks.'38  Indirectly, no-till agriculture raises the
potential risks involved with genetically modified crops that are de-
signed specifically to be herbicide-resistant in a no-till world.13 9
Beyond these complicated and competing sets of issues, numerous
and equally important scientific questions of valuation and calculation
must be resolved before any particular no-till project can genuinely
count as an offset. 140 Some soil types work better than others in se-
questering carbon. 14 1 There is a time lag in some soils, when farmers
switch to no-till, before carbon sequestration occurs.142 All soils have
a saturation point after which their ability to sequester additional car-
bon ceases.14 3 Some soils reach this saturation point sooner than oth-
m See ESTIMATE OF CARBON MITIGATION, supra note 121, at 16 ("The estab-
lishment of the RFS presents ... obstacles in projecting available land for GHG miti-
gation activities. ... the RFS itself requires that corn-starch ethanol . . . have lower
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than conventional (fossil) fuels. Therefore, any
emission reductions resulting from conservation practices used on feedstock-
producing lands may be needed for compliance with the RFS. A key component of
"additionally" is that for an offset to be valid, the practice being credited would not
have been done in the absence of the offset market. Granting an offset in this case
would effectively allow producers to double-count their emissions reductions - once
to meet the RFS life-cycle standard and once for sale or credit as an offset.").
138 See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 15, at 1569-73 (discussing scientific evi-
dence of atrazine's potential risks to human health).
139 See id. at 1576-77 (discussing evidence of increasing weed resistance from
use of genetically modified herbicide-resistant crops).
140 It is possible, however, if not preferable, also to create an offset system
that rewards implementation within a "sector" of economic activity rather than on a
project-by-project basis. See Richards, supra note 119, at 553-54.
141 See A. Franzluebbers, Soil Organic Carbon Sequestration and Agricultur-
al Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Southeastern USA, 83 SoIL & TILLAGE RES. 120
(2005).
142 See, e.g., Susan Capalbo et al., Sensitivity of Carbon Sequestration Costs
to Economic and Biological Uncertainties, 33 ENvTL. MGMT. S238, S241 (2004)
(stating there is often a 5-10 year time lag before soil C accumulates enough to show
improvements in soil productivity); Richards, supra note 119, at 555 (sequestration
rates sometimes do not achieve peak uptake rates until 20-40 years after implementa-
tion begins).
143 See, e.g., PASTURES Sys. & WATERSHED MGMT. RES. UNIT, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., FACT SHEET: SOIL CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN
PASTURES, http://www.umaine.edu/grazingguide/Main%20Pages/2009%20ars
%20fact%20sheets/USDA-ARS%20University%2OPark%2OFact%20Sheets%20
Posters%202009/Soil%20carbon%20sequestration%20in%20pastures.pdf (last
visited Apr. 5, 2010) (converted soils from cropland to pasture generally accumulate
C for 15-25 years then reach a saturation point where C inputs and losses are about
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ers.'" All soils give up their sequestered carbon if they are (even
once) tilled, raising questions of permanence and accountability.145
Accordingly, many regional cap-and-trade schemes emerging in the
United States (such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the
Northeast) did not accept agricultural offsets based on soil
sequestration.'* Existing cap-and-trade schemes overseas, such as
the European Union's Emission Trading System, also did not accept
agricultural offsets based on soil sequestration. 147
As the ACES legislation moved through the House of Representa-
tives, the House initially gave serious attention to the need for agricul-
tural offsets to be based on scientific assurances that the proffered
offsets were genuine. The bill's early versions required regulators to
use guidance from independent experts on the authenticity of agricul-
tural sequestration, including specifically guidance on questions of
additionality.14 8 In the same vein, soil-sequestration activities under-
taken in the past would not be used to offset future, continued GHG
emissions from sources within the cap and there was adequate en-
forcement authority to ensure compliance with practices for which
farmers might receive offset payments. 14 9
Enter last-minute politics. As the ACES legislation moved
through the House of Representatives, and it became clear that sup-
port from the agricultural bloc was especially pivotal to its passage, so
equal).
14 See, e.g., Keith Paustian et al., Consortium for Agric. Soils Mitigation of
Greenhouse Gases, Soil C Saturation: Determining Rates and Limits of Carbon Se-
questration, http://www.casmgs.colostate.edu/insider/vigview.aspaction=2&titleid
=277 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) ("[E]ach pool has its own dynamics and stabilizing
mechanisms.").
145 See, e.g., Extension, Why Is Continuous No-till Better Than Tilling a Field
Every Two to Five Years?, http://www.extension.org/faq/4609 (last visited Apr. 5,
2010) ("Tillage ... will immediately cancel much of the benefits from the previous
years of no-till cropping.").
146 See, e.g., SOIL CARBON CTR. AT KANSAS STATE UNIv. REGIONAL CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. BEGINNING TO TAKE ACTION, http:l/soilcarboncenter
.k-state.eduloriginals/Regional programspage.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010)
(RGGI does not allow offsets based on agricultural soil sequestration).
147 See, e.g., Linda M. Young et al., Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture: EU
and US Perspectives 6 EUROCHOICES 32, 33 (2007) (the EU has excluded agricultural
soil sequestration from its carbon market).
148 See Economic Opportunities for Agriculture, Forestry Communities, and
Others in Reducing Global Warming Pollution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 11Ith Cong. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Krupp] (statement
of Fred Krupp, Environmental Defense Fund).
149 id
15o See Steven D. Cook, Farm Groups Call for Climate Legislation to Allow
Unlimited Agricultural Offsets, 40 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1286 (June 5, 2009) (citing Jon
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farm groups began to press for changes in the offset provisions. Ra-
ther than providing an opportunity for EPA to consider the scientific
integrity of agricultural offsets after input from an independent panel
of experts, the agricultural lobby wanted a "list" of "farm and forestry
practices that would be pre-approved as offsets after a brief review by
the federal government."st Separately, farm groups sought that the
U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), rather than the EPA, ex-
ercise regulatory authority over offset integrity. 5 2 Farm groups also
wanted assurances that GHG-reducing measures taken in the past, or
taken for other conservation reasons, would nonetheless be eligible
under the offset provisions of the legislation.'
In the end, the House of Representative's ACES legislation re-
flected almost everything the agricultural bloc demanded about
offsets. Not only did ACES appear to "codify" an extensive list of
offsets without regard to the underlying scientific uncertainties over
their integrity, 15 4 but it excluded any "express provision for deleting
project types from the list, even if they are ever found to undermine
the intent of the legislation."155 The original provision for an expert
Offset Integrity Board was replaced with a more generic advisory
board without requirements "for any specific credentials, scientific or
otherwise, [or] conflict of interest provisions." 5 6 Supervision over
offsets was given to the USDA, rather than to the EPA.157
As of this writing, it is unclear whether a final climate bill will re-
flect all of these agricultural concessions. The principal Senate Bill,
the "Kerry-Boxer Bill," was introduced September 30, 2009, and of-
fers some evidence of retrenchment. It would delegate offset imple-
Scholl, President of the American Farmland Trust, as concluding that "the bill cannot
pass without strong support from farm states").
151 id.
152 See Agriculture Groups Seek to Limit EPA Offsets Role in Climate Bill, 3
CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 23, June 8, 2009 ("Agriculture and forestry groups are
ramping up lobbying efforts to revise pending House climate legislation by giving the
Department of Agriculture, rather than EPA, authority over future greenhouse gas
emissions offsets programs.").
153 Id. (referring to recognition for "early actors" and for not barring "carbon
offset projects from being included in other markets for environmental services").
154 See Krupp, supra note 148, at 4 ("The House bill appears to codify an
extensive list of project types, which is described as the minimum set of activities
eligible for credit under the offsets program.").
1 Id.
156 id.
157 See Climate Bill, supra note 84, at 1 ("Energy and Commerce Committee
Chairman Henry Waxman and Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson
reached agreement under which the USDA, and not the EPA, would oversee an
emissions offset program for farmers.").
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mentation to "the President," rather than to either the USDA or the
EPA, apparently in an effort simply to defuse the issue.'"8 Kerry-
Boxer: (1) calls for "consideration, but not necessarily adoption" of
the range of agricultural offset projects listed in the bill;" 9 (2) pro-
vides for regulators to examine the possibility of co-detriments in
proposed offset types;o60 and (3) allows an advisory committee up to
one year to issue its recommendations on offset integrity.' Of
course, the Kerry-Boxer bill has not yet even moved to the Senate
floor for consideration. And there are reports of language from com-
peting Senate bills that would move policy back towards the version
of ACES passed by the House1 6 2 or that, as of Winter 2010, might
drastically scale back any cap-and-trade program.163
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: SURPRISINGLY, NOT
AS DARK AS YOU MIGHT IMAGINE
In some ways, it is easy to conclude this Article pessimistically.
Just as there is hope for a more fundamental and holistic environmen-
tal law of agriculture, the climate legislation considered in
Summer 2009 showed too many signs of business-as-usual, special-
interest distortions.
But there is also a more optimistic way to assay these develop-
ments. First, that politics is playing a role in any legislation can hard-
158 See Senate Proposals May Foreshadow Battle Over Carbon Offsets, 3
CARBON CONTROL NEWS No. 40, Oct. 5, 2009 (Kerry-Boxer punts key issues to the
President, stopping short of farm state demands that USDA be given the lead role on
agriculture and forestry offsets).
15 Id.
160 Id
161 Id.
162 See id. at 2 (draft offsets language is being developed by Senator Debbie
Stabenow and Max Baucus that would "establish clear authority for USDA to run the
domestic offset program" and would require "adoption" initially of several listed
offset types even in the absence of expert recommendations about their integrity); see
also Noelle Straub & Allison Winter, Climate: Lincoln Says Ag Panel Likely to Mark
Up Climate Bill, ENVTL. & ENERGY NEWS PM, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.eenews
.net/eenewspm/print/2009/09/30/4 (quoting Blanche Lincoln, newly installed Chair of
the Senate Agriculture Committee, as saying, "Depending on how we designed a cap-
and-trade system - I'm just saying I reserve the right to certainly make sure that any-
thing that is designed is going to meet the needs of agriculture . . . ."); see also id.
(Senator Klobuchar said "she wants to make sure the Senate bill includes all the
measures [House Agriculture Committee Chair] Peterson negotiated for the House.").
163 See, e.g., Dean Scott, Obama Says Senate May Have to Drop Cap-and-
Trade, Focus on Energy Measures, ENv'T REP. (BNA) (Feb. 3, 2010) (quoting
Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander, "I don't believe in an economy cap-and-trade
[approach] and won't vote for one.").
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ly be cause for surprise. But second, and more hopefully, the final
legislation on both biofuels and agricultural carbon offsets at least
began the larger project that Rachel Carson championed: of self-
consciously seeking to connect environmental concerns with the
underlying economic activity of agriculture.
